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MAY-JUNE, 1958
CHOICE 'OF THE APPLICABLE LAW IN COLORADO
By GORDON C. SMITH
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emy of International Law at the Peace
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Whenever an action-whether based on contract or tort-has sub-
stantial elements in two or more states having different local laws, it
becomes necessary to determine which of these laws shall govern the
rights and obligations of the parties. The ensuing problems incident to
deciding which law shall govern comprise a great portion of that branch
of the law known as conflict of laws or private international law.
1
Prior to the nineteenth century this area of the law was quite unim-
portant in both England and the United States;' therefore precedent is
relatively sparse. Furthermore, the precedent that does exist is con-
fused not only by the number of divergent choice of law theories em-
ployed in different jurisdictions, but by decisions handed down by the
same court advancing inconsistent theories. Confusion is especially
prevalent in cases involving a choice as to what law determines the
validity of a contract.' Although there exists some divergence of rules
relative to determining what law governs a tort action,' the choice of
law rules of tort liability are relatively uniform when compared with
those of contracts.
The purpose of this article is twofold-first, to enunciate the diverse
choice of law theories concerning both contracts and torts which are
presently employed, and second, to review analytically the Colorado
decisions in relation to these various theories.
CONTRACT CHOICE OF LAW THEORIES
When a court is confronted with a contract connected with two or
1 Both designations have been criticized. The term "conflict of laws" is criticized
because it suggests a struggle between two laws for mastery and because it is too
narrow in scope. It has been suggested that "concord of laws" or "choice of laws"
would be more appropriate. The term "private international law" has been criticized
because the rules are not a private species of the body of rules which prevails between
one nation and another as they should be if the term international is taken in its
accepted legal meaning. See Goodrich, Conflict of Laws § 5 (3d ed. 1949).
2 Stumberg, Conflict of Laws 2-6 (2d ed. 1951). Professor Stumberg states that
the first complete work in English dealing with Conflict of Laws was by Story whose
treatise was published in 1834. Having before him but few cases and consequently no
common-law tradition, he turned to the works of continental jurists basing his con-
clusions largely upon the theories of the Dutch jurists.
3 Goodrich, Conflict of Laws 321 (3d ed. 1949).
4 Morris, The Proper Law of a Tort, 64 Harv. L. Rev. 881 (1951).
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more jurisdictions, and it determines that some question relating to the
contract is one of substance, the court must decide upon the course it will
pursue in choosing the substantive law to be applied.' The question
which has arisen most often and has proved the most troublesome is
what law shall govern the validity of a contract. At least the following
five diverse choice of law theories concerning validity of contracts have
been employed by Anglo-American courts:
1) The Law of the Place of Contracting (lex loci contractus). The
rule that the place of making or executing governs the validity of a con-
tract has been adopted by the Restatement' and has the support of a
number of writers.' Critics of this rule stress the difficulties inherent in
determining the place of making and point out that this place may
have no substantial relation to the agreement.' For example, a contract
to be performed in Wyoming by Wyoming parties might happen to be
prepared and executed in Denver, Colorado, perhaps in the office of a
Denver law firm. Although the contract, after it has been executed, has no
connection with Colorado, according to this choice of law theory Colo-
rado law would govern its validity. Professor Stumberg states that only
a minority of the American states have professed to follow the place of
making rule.'
2) The Law of the Place of Performance (lex loci solutionis)."
This theory has been advanced on the ground that the place of per-
formance usually is of greater significance to the contract than the place
of making and that the parties can thus be presumed to have intended
the place of performance to govern the validity. However, difficulty
arises when several places of performance are named or when no place
of performance is named."
5 As a general rule matters of procedure are governed by the law of the forum.
See Restatement, Conflict of Laws § 585; see also Stumberg, Conflict of Laws 134
(2d ed. 1951).
6 Restatement, Conflict of Laws § 332 (1934). Id. § 311 comment d provides that a
contract is deemed to have been made where the "principal event" necessary to
make it a binding obligation took place. See also Goodrich, Conflict of Laws § 107
(3d ed. 1949). The "principal event" mentioned in the Restatement seens to be synony-
mous with Goodrich's "last act."
7 Beale, What Law Governs the Validity of a Contract, 23 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 79,
194, 260 (1910); see also 2 Beale, Conflict of Laws § 332.4 (1935) and Goodrich, Conflict
of Laws 323 (3d ed. 1949).
s Nussbaum, Principles of Private International Law 164-66 (1943).
9 Stumberg, Conflict of Laws 226 (2d ed. 1951).
10 In a general summary written in 1910, Professor Beale gave a plurality of states
as applying the place of performance rule. Beale, What Law Governs the Validity
of a Contract, 23 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 79, 194, 260 (1910).
11 Stumberg, Conflict of Laws 232-34 (2d ed. 1951).
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3) The Law Intended by the Parties."2  The English courts have
sought to apply the law or laws by which the parties intended, or may
fairly be presumed to have intended, the contract to be governed. Often
where the contract expressly states the parties' intention that it shall be
governed by the law of a particular jurisdiction, their intention will be
effectuated by the courts if the chosen law has some meaningful con-
nection with the contract."'
4) The Law Which Upholds the Contract." Under this theory
courts look to either the place of contracting or of performance and
sometimes to some other place having a substantial connection with the
contract and apply whichever law will validate the agreement. This
rule is often used in commercial contracts requiring interest payments
which are usurious and invalid under the laws of one or several of the
jurisdictions connected with the loan. The rationale, of course, is that
the parties intended to make a valid contract and that this intent should
be effectuated.
5) The "Center of Gravity" Theory. This rule has also been termed
the "grouping of contacts," "most vital connection," "accumulation of
contact points" and also the "proper law" of the contract. The latter
term, however, has been used to designate the English rule that the law
presumably intended by the parties governs a contract." Textwriters
are agreed that this method as employed by the English courts to find
the "proper law" in order to give effect to the intention of the parties
is actually an attempt to find the place most vitally connected with the
contract."
This theory is the most recent to be utilized by the American courts.
It does not appear as one of the choice of law theories in earlier legal
treatises; in fact, it is not mentioned in Professor Strumberg's 1951 treat-
ise."
Under this theory the courts, instead of regarding as conclusive
the parties' intention or the place of contracting or performance or the
law which upholds the contract, lay emphasis upon the law of the place
which has the most significant contacts with the matter in dispute. The
theory has been criticized as being merely a device for reconciling cases
12 In numerical strength, according to Professor Beale's summary in 1910, the
states following this rule rank second. This rule was probably most frequently fol-
lowed by the United States Supreme Court prior to the decision of Erie R. R. Co. v.
Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938) when federal courts were free to apply their own notions
of conflict of laws in cases of diversity of citizenship. See Stumberg, Conflict of Laws
234 (2d ed. 1951).
11 For a general analysis of this theory of law see Note, Conflict of Laws; "Party
Autonomy" in Contracts, 57 Colum. L. Rev. 553 (1957). The note concludes by stating:
"Theoretically there appear to be no sound objections to permitting contracting
parties to select the law governing the validity of their contract if (1) the chosen
law has some meaningful connection with the contract, (2) the choice of law is freely
arrived at on a basis of- equal bargaining power, and (3) compelling public policy
considerations, particularly as embodied in local protective statutes, do not
dictate applicaton of the law of the forum." Id. at 576.
14 Goodrich, Conflict of Laws § 111 (3d ed. 1949). See also Stumberg, Conflict of
Laws 237-40 (2d ed. 1951).
15 See Morris and Cheshire, The Proper Law of a Contract in Conflict of Laws,
56 L.Q. Rev. 320 (1940).
16 See Cheshire, Private International Law 199-204 (4th ed. 1952).
17 Although Stumberg does not mention this theory as a separate theory he in
effect discusses it under the theory of "Intention of the parties." See Stumberg,
Conflict of Laws 234-36 (2d ed. 1951).
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actually decided according to more traditional choice of law rules and
as a means of granting judges an excessively broad discretion in weigh-
ing various contacts. 8 On the other hand, this theory has been praised
because it gives to the place having the most interest in the problem
paramount control over the legal issues arising out of a particular factual
context, thus allowing the forum to apply the policy of the jurisdiction
most intimately concerned with the outcome of the particular litigation."
The case of Auten v. Auten, ° a recent New York decision employ-
ing this theory, merits attention, principally because it has received so
much comment,1 but also because it might well pave the way for other
courts, including those of Colorado, to utilize this comparatively new ap-
proach. The "center of gravity" theory was applied in the Auten case
under the following circumstances: The parties, husband and wife,
were married in England and lived there with their two children for
fourteen years, when the husband allegedly deserted his wife and come to
the United States. The wife came to New York for the purpose of making
a separation agreement. The agreement entered into by the two parties
obligated the husband to pay to a trustee for his wife, who was to
return to England, fifty pounds per month for the support of herself
and the children, and obligated the wife not to sue in any action relating
to their separation. The wife returned to England and subsequently
is Note, 40 Cornell L.Q. 772 (1955).
19 Note, 3 Utah L. Rev. 490 (1953).
20 308 N.Y. 155, 124 N.E.2d 99, 50 A.IR. 2d 246 (1954).
21 The Auten case has been commented on in various notes, e.g., 24 Fordham L.
Rev. 268 (1955); 40 Cornell L.Q. 772 (1955); 6 Syracuse L. Rev. 381 (1955).
Especially helpful in Colorado!
The new (ees of
American Law Reporfs 2d
Even though your courts have not yet passed on a
question, you can quickly locate every case in point
from other jurisdictions. You find them all
gathered in one place, analyzed and correlated.
Right now, terms on the new "50 Series" of ALR 2d
are low. For details, write either publisher today.
BANCROFT-WHITNEY CO. BENDER-MOSS CO.
McAIlister & Hyde Streets 9 1 M c A I I i s t e r S t r e e t
San Francisco 1. California San Francisco 2, California
DICTA
MAY-JUNE, 1958
brought an action in an English court for separation, charging the hus-
band with adultery. The present action was brought in New York to
recover installments due for support and maintenance under the agree-
ment. The issue was whether the wife's commencement of the English
action constituted a repudiation of the separation agreement and ef-
fected a forfeiture of her right to any payments under it. The lower
court concluded that New York law was to be applied and dismissed
the complaint. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the English
law rather than New York law applied. The latter court, concluding
that England had all the truly significant contacts, stated:
"By stressing the significant contacts, it enables the court,
not only to reflect the relative interests of the several jurisdic-
tions involved but also to give effect to the probable intention
of the parties and consideration to whether one rule or the
other produces the best practical result.11
2 2
It should be noted that the validity of the contract was not in
question, but rather whether there was a breach. The court could have
relied solely on the conventional rule that matters of performance and
breach of a contract are governed by the law of the place of perform-
ance, because so far as the wife's performance was concerned, the place
was England. The court, however, chose to enunciate and follow the
"center of gravity" theory in deciding the applicable law. The Auten
case was not the first case to utilize this theory2 ' nor has it been the last,
for subsequent to this case the theory has been employed by the New
York state courts22 as well as by the federal courts sitting in New York."
It is generally conceded by the federal courts in New York that the New
York Court of Appeals has adopted this theory. Thus a federal district
court in Mutual Life Insurance Company v. Simon2 7 stated:
"Abandoning unitary formulas such as 'the place of con-
tracting' or 'the place of performance,' the New York Court of
Appeals has adopted the 'grouping of contacts' theory .... This
approach requires the application of 'the policy of the jurisdic-
tion most intimately connected with the outcome of the partic-
ular litigation.' At the same time this doctrine enables the
court, not only to reflect the relative interests of the several juris-
dictions involved . . . but also to give effect to the probable in-
tention of the parties and consideration to whether one rule or
the other produces the best practical result."'"
Much more could have been written about the various choice of
law theories presently employed by the courts,2 1 but this cursory back-
22 124 N.E.2d at 102.
23 Restatement, Conflict of Laws § 370 (1934) states: "The law of the place of
performance determines whether a breach has occurred."
24 The "center of gravity" theory was -employed in New York in several cases
prior to the Auten case, e.g., Rubin v. Irving Trust Co., 305 N.Y. 288, 113 N.EI.2d 424
(1953); Jones v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 158 Misc. 466, 286 N.Y. Supp, 4 (Sup. Ct.
1936).
25 See e.g., Anderson v. Anderson, 147 N.Y.S.2d 353 (Sup. Ct. 1955).
26 See e.g., Global Commerce Corp. v. Clark-Babbitt Industries, 239 F.2d 716
(2d Cir. 1956); Fricke v. Isbrandtsen Co., 151 F.Supp. 465 (S.D.N.Y. 1957).
27 151 F.Supp. 408 (S.D.N.Y. 1957).
2S Id. at 411.
29 In addition to these five theories, courts have also emphasized the law of the
place where one or both of the contracting parties are domiciled, or in cases involving
real estate the law of the situs. For a recent discussion of choice of law rules in
Russia see Pisar, Soviet Conflict of Laws in International Commercial Transactions,
70 Harv. L. Rev. 593 (1957).
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ground will suffice to present an analytical review of the Colorado
decisions.
CONTRACT CHOICE OF LAW IN COLORADO
The f irst reported Colorado case involving the choice of law of a
contract was Roop v. Delahaye" decided in 1874 by the Supreme Court
of Colorado Territory. The action, instituted in Colorado, was based on
a promisory note which the defendant claimed was invalid under the
laws of Iowa where made. The Court apparently conceded that Iowa
law would govern the validity of the note, but held that the defense
that the note was made in a foreign state, upon a consideration which
was void under a law of that state, should be specially pleaded.
Another early case, decided in 1887, was that of Hochstadter v.
Hays," which involved an action for the price of goods sold to a firm
in Missouri, of which the defendant, a married woman, was a member.
The law in Missouri at that time held that a married woman's contracts
were valid only as against her separate estate in equity. The Colorado law
was to the contrary-that a married woman could sue and be sued as a
feme sole. But the court applied the Missouri law and held that a personal
judgment against the defendant could not be sustained. The~court said:
" [I] t is a familiar principle that the nature, validity, ob-
ligation and interpretation of contracts are to be governed by
the lex loci, and we are of the opinion that there is a defect of
30 2 Colo. 307 (1874).
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obligation in the contract sued upon which forbids judgment
asked for. What the defendant undertook to do within her legal
capacity to contract constitutes the obligation of her contract.
• . . Substantially she undertook that her separate estate then
existing might be subjected to the payment of the debt in case
of default. This was the extent of the obligation of her contract.
And this is all that the plaintiffs are entitled to ask any court,
whether in Missouri or elsewhere, to enforce. We cannot change
the nature of the contract or add to its obligations.""
Wolf v. Burke " involved an action on a parol contract, made and
to be performed in Idaho, for the sale of mining land located in Idaho,
The Colorado statute of frauds provided that every contract for the sale
of land or any interest therein "shall be void unless the contract or some
note or memorandum thereof is in writing."" The Colorado Supreme
Court held that the law of Idaho, where the contract was made, deter-
mined the validity of the contract. Some courts have held that a statute
of frauds relates to procedure" rather than substance, in which case the
law of the forum governs; but the Wolf case definitely classifies the
statute of frauds as substantive.
Although the Colorado decisions mentioned thus far, and also
others" seem to favor the first theory discussed under the heading of
law of the place of contracting, these decisions do not actually reject the
other theories. The contests in these cases were all between the law of the
place of contracting and the law of the forum, rather than between the
law of place of contracting and the law of the place of performance, that
intended by parties, that which upholds the contract, or that place which
has the most significant contacts. However, in Cockburn v. Kinsley"
the court was directly confronted with the problem of whether the
validity of a contract should be governed by the law of the place where
the contract was made, by the law of the place of performance, or by
the law intended by the parties. In this case, a promissory note was
executed in Colorado by the president and secretary of an Arizona
mining corporation doing business in Mexico. The note was payable
in Minnesota. The Colorado Court of Appeals held that the liability of
the directors was to be determined by the law of Colorado, the place
of making, which law the Court said was impressed on the note when
made. The court expressly rejected the view that the law of Minnesota,
the place of performance, should determine the contract's validity.
The court stated:
"The law is quite plain that where the contract is made in
32 Id. at 123, 17 Pac. at 292.
33 18 Colo. 264, 32 Pac. 427, 19 L.R.A. 792 (1893).
34 Gen. Stat. 1883, § 1517.
35 Goodrich, Conflict of Laws § 88 (3d ed. 1949); Stumberg, Conflict of Laws 141
(2d ed. 1951).
36 E.g., Ancient Order of the Pyramids v. Dixon, 45 Colo. 95, 100 Pac. 427 (1909);
Sullivan v. German Nat'l Bank, 18 Colo. App. 99, 70 Pac. 162 (1902); Des Moines Life
Ass'n v. Owen, 10 Colo. App. 131, 50 Pac. 210 (1897).
37 25 Colo. App. 89, 135 Pac. 1112 (1913).
FOR RENT-Single, carpeted office in five room suite, in new First National Bank
building. J. Glenn Donaldson, 1340 First National Bank Bldg., AC 2-5807.
DICTA
MAY-JUNE, 1958
one state and performance is to be in another, the law of the
place of performance governs with reference to all questions con-
cerning the performance, whether the suit be brought in that
place or not . . . and that the law of the place where the suit
is brought governs in all questions concerning the remedy . . .
and that the law of the place where the contract is made governs
all questions concerning the validity of the note and the capacity
of the makers thereof." 8
The court also apparently rejected the theory that the law intended by
the parties governs the validity, as the court in quoting Wharton on
Conflict of Laws, sec. 427, states that a contract's "governing law should
be determined by a fixed rule not dependent upon the intention of
the parties.""
It cannot be denied that Colorado favors the theory that the law
of the place of making governs the validity of a contract. But it should
not be concluded that in all cases this theory is followed, for in McKay v.
Belknap Savings Bank"° the court appeared to follow the theory that the
law intended by the parties or possibly the law which upholds the con-
tract governs. In this case, a note was made in Colorado to bear interest
at 8%, but in the event of default, interest was to be at the rate of 12%.
The note was payable in New Hampshire where no higher rate than 6%
was allowable. The Supreme Court, holding that the lower court prop-
erly allowed interest at the increased rate, stated:
"The law upon this proposition is stated by Beach on Mod-
ern Law of Contracts, Vol. 1, sec. 606, as follows: 'When at the
place of contract, the rate of interest differs from that of the
place of payment, the parties may stipulate for either rate, and
the contract will govern, the parties having the right of election
as to the law of which place their contract is to be governed.. ....
The decision, however, would have reached the same result had
the court applied the law of the place of making. The McKay case is
cited in Baxter v. Beckwith" wherein a note made and payable in Iowa
was held to be governed by the laws of Iowa as to an interest provision
valid in Iowa but invalid in Colorado. The court seemed to base its
ruling on the "place of making" theory, but the court also stated:
"The parties may legally stipulate the payment of interest
according to the laws of the state where the instrument is made,
or according to the laws of the place of payment, and the rate
thus agreed upon may be recovered, although it may be illegal
under the laws of the other state.""
The McKay and Baxter cases" indicate that Colorado approves the
theory that the law intended by the parties (or the law which upholds
the contract) governs the validity of a contract. However, it should be
emphasized that the holding in the McKay case and the dictum of the
Baxter case apply only to usury situations. Whether the court will ex-
38 Id. at 93, 135 Pac. at 1113.
39 Id. at 95, 135 Pac. at 1114.
40 27 Colo. 50, 59 Pac. 745 (1899).
41 Id. at 56, 59 Pac. at 747.
42 25 Colo. App. 322, 137 Pac. 901 (1914).
43 Id. at 325, 137 Pac. at 902.
4 Accord, Eccles v. Herrick, 15 Colo. App. 350, 62 Pac. 1040 (1900).
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tend the McKay holdings to situations other than those involving in-
terest is, of course, a matter of speculation.
The cases decided in the federal courts of the District of Colo-
rado have given effect to the law of the place of making, but such de-
cisions do not expressly reject the other theories. In American Crystal
Sugar Company v. Nicholas" the federal court applied the law of Utah
to determine the effect of the parol evidence rule on a contract made in
Utah, but there was no actual contest between the different choice of law
theories. Gossard v. Gossard," also a federal case, involved the legal
effect of a contract made in Illinois. The court in this case stated:
"The law of the place where a contract is made governs
its nature, validity, and interpretation, unless it appears that
the parties when entering into the contract intended to be
bound by the law of some other place."'
7
Although the court did not follow the theory that the law intended
by the parties governs, as there was no need for such in the Gossard
case, it appears from the above statement that the court was not adverse
to the theory. There has thus far been no indication that the Colorado
courts would extend this theory to the "proper law" as understood by
the English decisions, that is, the law which the parties may fairly be
presumed to have intended, but on the other hand there has been no
indication that the courts would reject the theory.
It is only when the Colorado .courts are confronted with the
problem of determining the validity of a marriage contract that they
are bound by statute to employ the law of the place of contracting.
The pertinent statute of Colorado provides:
"All marriages contracted without this state, which shall
be valid by the laws of the country in which the same were
contracted, shall be valid in all courts within this state. This
section shall not be construed so as to allow bigamy or polygamy
in this state.""
Spencer v. People" involved a proceeding on a petition charging
a 30-year-old husband with contributing to the deliquency of a 15-year-
old minor female to whom he was married. The Colorado Supreme
Court, relying on the above-mentioned statute, held that since the mar-
45 124 F.2d 477 (10th Cir. 1941).
46 149 F.2d 111 (10th Cir. 1945).
47 Id. at 112.
48 Colo. Rev. Stat. § 90-1-5 (1953).
49 133 Colo. 196, 292 P.2d 971 (1956).
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riage was entered into in the state of Utah, where it was deemed valid
according to the laws of that state, the act of marriage was not an act of
delinquency. The court in Payne v. Payne" also relied on said statute in
holding that a marriage of a 16-year-old minor male, contracted in Texas
and valid under the laws of Texas, could not be annulled under the
Colorado statute making voidable all marriages wherein either party is
under the age of 18 years. 1
In contract choice of law situations, other than those involving the
validity of a marriage contract," the courts of Colorado are bound only
by the cases previously decided. It is submitted that these cases do not
actually limit the courts to any single theory. Had any one or all of the
foregoing cases, except those involving marriage contracts, been decided
under the "center of gravity" theory, the result or results would probably
have been the same. In cases following the place of making theory, the
place of making was actually the "center of gravity" of the contract. In
cases involving usury where the place of performance was applied, said
place of performance was probably the "center of gravity." Said theory
has not yet found expression in the Colorado cases, but it no doubt
will, when a particular factual situation warrants. Although the theory
might appear somewhat nebulous and perhaps even arbitrary in its
application, it can fulfill the expectations of the parties more ade-
quately than the law of the place of making or any other single theory.
In most cases there will be no necessity for the courts to look beyond
the place of making, but where a situation arises when inequity would
result by looking only to the place of making, it is predicted that the
court would, and it is suggested that the court should, apply the"center of gravity" theory in determining what law is to govern the
validity of a contract.
TORT CHOICE OF LAW RULES
The prevailing view as to tort liability in America is that the law
of the place of wrong determines whether a person has sustained a legal
injury."2 According to this view, it is immaterial whether the harm in
question was or was not a legal injury by the law of the forum or by the
law of the place where the actor acted." A few American courts have
refused relief where the local law was substantially different from the
foreign law, but most American courts have held that the existence of a
cause of action at the forum is determined by reference to the substan-
tive law of the place of the wrong or tort, regardless of the local law
of the forum.5
50 121 Colo. 212, 214 P.2d 495 (1950).
51 Colo. Rev. Stat. § 46-3-1 (1
9 5
3), provides: "All marriages wherein either party
is under the age of eighteen years are hereby declared to be voidable."
52 In New York the courts even apply the "center of gravity" theory to marriage
contracts, e.g., see Anderson v. Anderson, 147 N.Y.S.2d 353 (Sup. Ct. 1955), wherein
the court stated at page 355: "Moreover, all the significant factors involved in this
cause of action are in this state. Except for the marriage all essential elements of
the cause took place here: the parties met and lived in New York during their court-
ship; the proposal and acceptance, the representation and the actual execution of the
affidavit for the license occurred in New York. We may borrow from the field of
conflict of laws the principle of 'grounding of contacts' in which the courts apply the
law of the state which has the most significant contacts with the particular matter
involved."
53 Restatement, Conflict of Laws § 378 (1934). Id. § 377 states: "The place of
wrong is in the state where the last event necessary to make an actor liable for an
alleged tort takes place."
54 Id. comment b.
65 Stumberg. Conflict of Laws 183 (2d ed. 1951).
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The rule in England is that the conduct must be wrongful under the
civil or criminal law of the place where it occurred, and also actionable
under the internal law of England. " A new approach, however, has been
advocated by Professor Morris " for both England and America. He sug-
gests that a proper law doctrine be applied to torts similar to the proper
law doctrine as applied to the question whether the defendant is liable
for breach of contract. Professor Morris asks, "Why should we not reach
results which are socially convenient and sound by applying the proper
law doctrine to the question whether the defendant is liable for tort?""8
He states that the proper law approach intelligently applied would
furnish a much needed flexibility. He concedes that in many cases
there would be no need to look beyond the law of the place of wrong,
so long as there is no doubt where the place is. But he suggests having
a conflict rule sufficiently broad and flexible to take care of exceptional
as well as normal situations, or else formulating an entirely new rule
to deal with the exceptional situations. Otherwise, he claims, the results
will offend our common sense.
TORT CHOICE OF LAW IN COLORADO
The courts in Colorado, both state and federal, have followed the
general rule that the law of the place of the wrong determines whether
a person has sustained a legal injury. In Atchison, T. and S. F. Ry. Co.
v. Betts," an early Colorado decision, the plaintiff sued in Colorado to
recover damages for the death of a mule killed in New Mexico by the
defendant's train. The court applied the general rule and held that the
liability of the defendant was governed by the laws of New Mexico where
the accident occurred.
The courts of Colorado also apply the law of the place of wrong in
wrongful death actions. In Denver & Rio Grande Ry. Co. v. Warring,"
the husband of the plaintiff was killed in New Mexico while in the em-
ployment of the defendant railroad. He was a resident of Colorado and
his widow was appointed administratix in Colorado. She brought an
action here to recover damages for wrongful death, basing her claim on
the New Mexico statute. The court held that she was the proper person
to sue, in accordance with the New Mexico statute, although under the
wrongful death statute of Colorado the right to sue is in the heir. Stolz v.
Burlington Transportation Company," a federal case involving a wrong-
ful death statute, held that the limitation of $5,000 in the Colorado wrong-
ful death statute"' does not apply in the action brought in the federal
court in Colorado on a cause of action arising in Utah.
There appears not the slightest tendency to deviate from the well
accepted rule that tort liability is governed by the lex loci delicti. Had
there been any inclination to follow Professor Morris' proper law theory
of a tort, it would have no doubt found expression in the case of Pando
56 See Cheshire, Private International Law Ch. XI (3d ed. 1947) for a discussion
of the English rule.
57 Morris, The Proper Law of a Tort, 64 Harv. L. Rev. 881 (1951).
58 Id. at 883.
59 10 Colo. 431, 15 Pac. 821 (1887).
60 37 Colo. 122, 86 Pac. 305 (1906).
61 178 F.2d 514 (10th Cir. 1949).
62 The limitation in a wrongful death action is now $25,000.
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v. Jasper.3 In this case plaintiff was injured in Kansas while riding as a
passenger in an automobile driven and owned by defendant, when the
automobile left the road and struck a pole. It appears from reading the
case that plaintiff and defendant were both residents of Colorado and
started their drive in Colorado, but happened to cross the border into
Kansas. Professor Morris would advocate that the law of Colorado
rather than Kansas would be the proper law of the tort, assuming, of
course, that the only connection with Kansas was that the injury oc-
curred there; and as a result, Professor Morris would no doubt apply the
Colorado Guest Statute. The Colorado Supreme Court, however, stated
that plaintiff's claim was governed by the lex loci delicti, but held that
the lower court erred in admitting the Kansas Guest Statute in evidence
when it had not been pleaded.
It is predicted that the courts of Colorado will be very reluctant to
depart even slightly from the long-accepted rule that tort liability is
governed by the law of the place of wrong; however, it is suggested that
in exceptional situations the proper law of a tort as defined by Professor
Morris should be afforded consideration by our courts.




How? With Automatic Message and
Answering Service (AMANDA). When
you leave for lunch, for an afternoon
appointment, or go home in the eve-
ning, you turn AMANDA on. Then,
when a customer calls, the machine
automatically records his message.
When you come back to the office, you
..J~l II Uknow exactly what your custo rer
wanted. No lost business. No disgusted
when prospects.
,ou're...
To get complete information,
just call your local telephone
manager. He'll hurry over
with all the details.
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